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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The State Misstates the Facts Before the Magistrate
The question before this Court is whether there was probable cause
presented to the magistrate to support the search warrant. This inquiry is limited
to the information presented to the magistrate at the time of the issuance of the
warrant. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686, 85 P.3d 656, 662 (2004). See also,
State’s Brief, pg. 4, citing State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365, 369, 93 P.3d 696, 700
(2000). Notwithstanding this, the state’s “Statement of the Facts” refers to the
Probable Cause Statement, which was filed after the search was executed, as well
as testimony presented at the motion to suppress as evidence of probable cause.
See, State’s Brief, pg. 1, ¶¶ 2-3. Those post-warrant statements are not pertinent to
this Court’s task and should not be considered.1
In particular, the state writes that “Mr. Morton told officers that he had been
staying in a trailer belonging to [Mr.] Sutton in the adjacent RV park and had used
methamphetamine intravenously earlier in the day. (Tr. Pg. 108, Ls. 2-9; r., p. 11.)”

1

The state, in a footnote, suggests that the magistrate considered some
statements in addition to photographs and the search warrant affidavit. State’s
Brief, pg. 2 n. 1. That does not appear to be the case. First, the officer testified that
it “seems like” the photographs were presented, but was not “100 percent sure” they
were. T pg. 128, ln. 1-4. He then said he “believed” there were statements and
photographs of the trailer, but was not sure about photographs of the needle caps.
T pg. 29, ln. 5-21. He was never asked to clarify about his level of certainty about
whether there were statements made or what the content of such statements might
have been. Thus, the record reflects the magistrate only “considered [the search
warrant] affidavit and some photographs of the trailer,” because the officer could
not say whether there were additional statements and photographs.
1

State’s Brief, pg. 1. The search warrant affidavit, however, does not contain any
information about where Mr. Morton was staying; nor does it mention Mr. Morton’s
intravenous use of methamphetamine that day. State’s Exhibit 1. And, while the
state asserts “Mr. Morton’s vehicle was also at the trailer,” the affidavit only says
the vehicle was “located at the scene 5362 South highway 191.” That address is the
location of the trailer park. Mr. Sutton’s trailer is located within that park at Lot
#14. State’s Exhibit 1. There is no information in the affidavit whether Mr.
Morton’s vehicle was in the lot or parked on the side of the highway, how many lots
are in the park, or how close Mr. Morton’s vehicle was to Mr. Sutton’s home.2 In
addition, the affidavit does not support the state’s claim “that officers had contacted
Mr. Morton at the trailer a couple days earlier . . . and found a needle with a
substance in it.” State’s Brief, pg. 1. It says that an officer responded to the trailer
for a report that Mr. Morton was suicidal. It does not say Mr. Morton was present
at that time or that the police spoke to him. Moreover, the affidavit states that the
needle was not found in the trailer, as suggested by the state. It was found outside.
State’s Exhibit 1. (The affidavit also says that Mr. Morton “was extremely
paranoid” about the people he thought were following him and “appeared to be on
some sort of drug,” which diminishes the believability of his statements, but those
facts are omitted from the state’s recitation.)
2

The officer later testified that Mr. Morton’s truck was parked at the front
entrance of the trailer park in a little parking lot area,” not at Mr. Sutton’s trailer.
T pg. 120, ln. 6-12.
2

B. The State Fails to Address the Authority Cited by Mr. Sutton.
The state fails to address the authority cited by Mr. Sutton in his Opening
Brief, i.e., United States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1466 (9th Cir. 1989) (admission
of drug use combined with a syringe cap and an empty bindle insufficient to
establish probable cause to search vehicle); McMillon v. Commonwealth, 184 S.E.2d
773, 775-76 (Va. 1971) (Regarding “hypodermic needles and syringes in McMillon’s
room, we agree with McMillon’s contention that there are many legitimate uses of
hypodermics and that there was no proof that McMillon’s use was illegal.”);
Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 659 S.E.2d 325 (Va. 2008) (“Evidence of intoxication
and vaguely ‘suspicious’ actions, without more, does not suffice to indicate that
hand-rolled cigarette materials are being used for the illegitimate purpose of
smoking marijuana, as opposed to the legitimate purpose of smoking tobacco.”); and
Brown v. Commonwealth, 620 S.E.2d 760, 763 (Va. 2005) (“[F]or the last 25 years,
this Court has consistently declined to find that probable cause can be established
solely on the observation of material which can be used for legitimate purposes,
even though the experience of an officer indicates that such material is often used
for illegitimate purposes.”); People v. Schmitz, 288 P.3d 1259, 1263 n.1 (Cal. 2012)
(“As the Attorney General notes, a syringe cap is not contraband[.]”). Consequently
no reply is needed.

3

C. The Facts Before the Magistrate Did Not Establish Probable Cause to
Believe Contraband or Evidence of a Crime Would Be Inside Mr. Sutton’s
Home.
The state erroneously uses evidence outside of the search warrant affidavit in
arguing there was probable cause. For example, it claims there was “clear nexuses
between Mr. Morton and recent intravenous methamphetamine use; between Mr.
Morton and [Mr.] Sutton’s trailer; and between Mr. Sutton’s trailer and syringes”
State’s Brief, pg. 6. However, the affidavit only says that Mr. Morton admitted that
he “used needles to shoot meth,” not that he shot-up meth recently. State’s Exhibit
1. And the “nexus” between Mr. “Sutton’s trailer and syringes” is that a needle
containing some unknown white substance and some needle caps were found
somewhere outside of the trailer. The affidavit does not state the caps were found
in “close proximity” to the trailer, as the state suggests. Id.3 There was no nexus
between illegal drug use by either Mr. Sutton or Mr. Morton and the interior of Mr.
Sutton’s trailer, as might be the case if the items had been found inside Mr. Sutton’s
garbage can. The fact that there is debris outside a home does not tend to show it
came from inside, nor does it tend to show there is more of the same inside.
Moreover, the affidavit does not state that Mr. Morton was staying at or had
recently been inside Mr. Sutton’s trailer.4 It says that the police had responded to
3

The officer later said he did not know how close they were to Mr. Sutton’s
trailer. T pg. 122, ln. 22-24.
4

The officer later claimed that Mr. Morton said he was staying at the trailer,
but the officer inexplicably neglected to put that highly germane fact in the search
warrant affidavit. Compare, State’s Exhibit 1, T pg. 108, ln. 17-20.
4

the trailer, “for a report that John Morton was suicidal.” Id. Nor does the affidavit
say the trailer was the scene of an “attempted suicide [by] John Morton,” as the
state writes. State’s Brief, pg. 8. But even if someone inside the trailer had
reported Mr. Morton was suicidal on May 31, that is not evidence Mr. Morton was
inside the home on that date, or that he was engaged in any illegal activities inside
the trailer. Further, reporting the doings of a mental unstable drug addict to the
police is not evidence that evidence of illegal activity is present inside your home.
The state argues that Mr. Morton’s claim that he was coming from Mr.
Sutton’s trailer could be reasonably understood to mean he was inside the trailer.
State’s Brief, pg. 8. But, of course, Mr. Morton could have parked, walked to Mr.
Sutton’s home, knocked on the door and left when no one answered. Id. And, even
if he entered the trailer, it does not logically follow that he obtained any contraband
inside the trailer. If a deputy attorney general is downtown in a drunken state,
hiding in an alleyway, whispering to a passersby that he came from court and is
being chased by judges, that does not suggest he obtained the alcohol from someone
inside the courthouse or that there is more alcohol within the courthouse, even if he
was in court earlier that day. The presence of used beer caps outside the courthouse
does not change the conclusion.
Finally, the state’s observation that Mr. Morton’s paranoia “was typical of
someone under the influence of drugs,” proves too much. Why Mr. Morton’s
statements about his drug use and his proximity to Mr. Sutton’s home should be

5

credited, while his delusions about being chased by enemies are disregarded goes
unexplained by the state. There is no reason to believe Mr. Morton’s was lucid on
those topics which the state claims support probable cause when he was paranoid
and delusional on other topics. Mr. Morton’s veracity is especially doubtful because
he had no prior record of providing accurate information to the police. Compare,
e.g., State v. Widner, 155 Idaho 840, 844, 317 P.3d 737, 741 (Ct. App. 2013). In fact,
none of Mr. Morton’s drug-addled statements are worthy of credit.
Even if deemed to be reliable, Mr. Morton’s statements to the police did not
link Mr. Sutton or his home to a crime.
The affidavit does not contain any information connecting the interior of Mr.
Sutton’s home to a crime. Mr. Morton did not claim to have obtained drugs from
Mr. Sutton. He never claimed that he had stored his own drugs within the home.
He never claimed to have seen drugs or drug paraphernalia inside the home.
Consequently, there was no nexus between Mr. Morton’s criminal activity, the items
sought to be seized, and the place to be searched.
III. CONCLUSION
The “totality of the circumstances” totally fails to establish probable cause to
search Mr. Sutton’s home. Thus, the magistrate abused his discretion in issuing the
warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Mr. Sutton asks the Court to reverse
the denial of his motion to suppress and to remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
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Respectfully submitted this 28th day of December, 2017.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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